Returning on March 26, 1796, to the Army of Italy to take charge after having left it eighteen months earlier as commander of the artillery under Dumerbion, Bonaparte found a static situation despite the moral and military victory. of Loano in November 1795. Scherer was distinguished above all by his apathy and considered unrealizable the plans with which his replacement bombarded him from Paris. A fine connoisseur of the Italian front, the new general-in-chief will, on the contrary, demonstrate the entire validity of his views by seizing Piedmont in fifteen days in a lightning war.
Bonaparte's plan, contrary to Kellermann's words (1), is struck by common sense... but also by audacity. It consists not of crossing the Alps but of going around them by following the coastline from Nice to Savona, then branching off towards Carcare and the Cadibona pass. Thus, the progression of the troops, between the Alps and the Apennines where the relief barely exceeds 400 m, is greatly facilitated. What's more, in Carcare, Austrians and Piedmontese joined. If Bonaparte manages to separate them as he proposes, the result would be a hiatus between the two armies which could only be resolved, due to terrain and roads, between 50 and 70 km further north. The French would then have every opportunity to beat the two enemies separately and force them to make peace (2).
An offensive spirit, Bonaparte also knows how to adapt to adverse circumstances. The Pijon brigade is already progressing towards Genoa, following orders given before its arrival. Very angry, the general-in-chief decides to integrate the fait accompli into his plan by transforming it into an advantage. Thus Pijon must reach Voltri to persuade de Beaulieu, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, that Bonaparte's main objective is Genoa and then Lombardy. Bet won: de Beaulieu, both convinced of the weakness of the French and eager to cover his Lombard bases and make contact with Nelson's English fleet, moved towards Genoa on April 8, hoping to prevent a French attack there and even envelop the enemy right wing. Without a single command or a common action plan, the Allies nevertheless intend to act in concert despite their notorious disagreement.
The Sardinians (3) hold the Cuneo-Mondovì-Millesimo line with an operational base in Turin and headquarters in Ceva. The Austrians concentrated d’Argenteau’s 10,000 to 11,000 men at Acqui Terme. De Beaulieu has 30,000 men in Alexandria. In Carcare, Provera has 10,000 men (theoretical strength) to ensure the Austro-Sardinian connection. Their base in Milan reaches them via Pavia and Alexandria on one side, and via Piacenza and Novi (headquarters) on the other.
The French advance
It was well-informed about this fragmented and overly stretched device (120 km) that Bonaparte, who left Nice on April 2, set up his headquarters in Savona on the 9th. He was perfectly aware that, if part of the enemy forces were beaten, the others would be forced to retreat. The campaign therefore promises to be as it pleases, especially since the 10th of Beaulieu engages Cervoni, who replaces Pijon, in Voltri. D’Argenteau, for his part, must descend on Savona on the 11th and take the French from behind. He won't have time.
He came up against the advanced elements of Colonels Forseny and Rampon at Montenegro who, entrenched, repelled several assaults with heavy losses, notably officers killed or wounded, including Major General Rukavina. Contrary to his advice, d'Argenteau then made the mistake of withdrawing and suspending the fight for the night, which allowed Bonaparte to concentrate his reinforcements. For his part, de Beaulieu, who recognized his error (4), sent part of his troops (Vukasović) towards Montenotte.
The Battle of Montenotte
On the 12th at 8 a.m., Bonaparte attacked frontally with Laharpe flanked by Forseny and Rampon, and from the flank with Masséna, i.e. 10,000 to 11,000 men. Augereau (10,000 men), is on flank guard at Carcare. D’Argenteau, who has 3,000 to 4,000, does not yet see Masséna, hidden by the brush and the fog. However, the numerical superiority of the French and the artillery sent to Montenegro decided him to retreat in echelons to Montenotte. At 9 a.m., he noticed Masséna's enveloping maneuver. Rushing with his only reserve battalion, he cannot restore the situation while in the center his rearguards are
powerless to contain the flow of attackers and the losses are already heavy. At 12:30 p.m., the retreat was general, the French shooting the fugitives from the heights. Laharpe (5) began the pursuit, overturned the delaying elements, several of whom were captured before even opening fire, and emerged at Montenotte, pushing the Austrians back onto Pontinvrea. By 3:30 p.m., the battle was over. For minimal losses (66 killed, 60 wounded, 10 prisoners), the French virtually destroyed d'Argenteau's forces (between 300 and 600 killed, 1,000 wounded, 1,500 prisoners). Bonaparte comes to congratulate his soldiers. Many discover his face and few are yet impressed.
The walk on Ceva
With the Allied center destroyed Bonaparte directs his efforts to Ceva. Contrary to the orders of the Directory, he wanted to beat the Piedmontese before the Austrians. On the 13th, at Millesimo, Augereau was however arrested by Provera, entrenched in the ruins of the castle of Cosseria, "an obstacle over which no bravery [can] triumph". Several assaults were bloody failures: in a quarter of an hour, “torrents of fire” caused 300 deaths and 600 wounded to the Republican troops (6). Joubert is wounded, and Generals Banel and Quesnel are killed. However, the clock is ticking for the attackers because Provera cannot physically hold out.
Furthermore, on the 14th, Masséna and Laharpe defeated the Austrians at Dego (7), definitively preventing von Colli-Marchini from rescuing Provera. The latter was forced to surrender (with military honors) while von Colli-Marchini was demoted from Montezemolo to Ceva, which distanced him even further from Beaulieu.
But on the 15th, Vukasović arrived at Dego with three battalions and chased away Masséna's men who were busy pillaging and destroying their batteries. Generals Causse and Banel are killed. It took the personal intervention of Bonaparte to restore the situation. The Austrians, pursued by the cavalry, nevertheless retreated to Acqui Terme. More numerous, they might perhaps have been able to restore the situation in favor of the Allies. Moreover, for Bonaparte, it was at Dego that the latter should have concentrated and thus acquired definitive superiority.
Having become cautious, the French did not appear in force in front of the (poorly) entrenched camp of Ceva until the 17th, the reconnaissance of the day before having been repulsed at Peddaggera (8). Bonaparte intended to surround the Piedmontese there. For his part, von Colli-Marchini, despite the composure and bravery his adversaries recognized in him, remained struck by the speed of their advance. Furthermore, certain of no longer being able to count on rapid Austrian aid and anticipating Bonaparte's maneuver, he decided to escape him the same night by sheltering behind the Tanaro and the Corsaglia his 12,000 to 13,000 men, with whom he blocked the road to the Piedmontese plain. Ten battalions are notably stationed on the 4 km separating Piozzo from Carrù, the “gateway to the Langhes” (9). Thus the French can invest in Ceva without firing a shot.
The Battle of San Michele
With this taken, Bonaparte can now advance through the Tanaro valley, which greatly hampers any Austrian attack. Eager to leave a demoralized adversary no respite, he ordered Sérurier to cut off the Piedmontese's communications with Mondovì at San Michele. At the same time, he avoided wasting time as before Cosseria and left only a few cannons (10) under the fort of Ceva, where von Colli-Marchini had left the governor and a weak garrison.
On the 19th, while Joubert's 6,000 men were reduced to shooting the enemy over the flooded Tanaro, Sérurier and his two brigades (3,000 men with Guieu and Fiorella) quickly penetrated the eastern part. of the village. Despite the Piedmontese resistance which hardened under the leadership of Brigadier Jean Dichat de Loisinge, the French also invested the western part of the village, following reinforcements coming to its aid. Violent street battles then began which slowed down their advance. But at 2 p.m., thanks mainly to the action of Fiorella, San Michele was in the hands of the Republican troops.
They immediately devote themselves to pillaging while success can only be complete if the heights are also taken. While the officers tried unsuccessfully to regroup their troops, von Colli-Marchini arrived on the scene. Receiving clear and sure orders, his troops moved forward and reinvested the place. Sérurier, who has no news from Augereau (11) and has no illusions about the success of his march, judges it prudent to order the retreat, thus sanctioning the failure of the French, who lost 800 men against 350 for the Piedmontese.
Recalling Laharpe de Dego, Bonaparte decided for the next day to mass around 17,000 men and almost all of his artillery along the Corsaglia. But von Colli-Marchini only has 8,000 or 9,000 men compared to 25,000 and can no longer face the French alone. Fearing being outflanked towards Cherasco and Turin, he decided, after a war council, to reach Mondovì during the night.
Mondovì objective
Seeing the enemy slip away at daybreak, Bonaparte immediately launched the pursuit. The Sardinians, powerless to maneuver, pushed aside despite fierce resistance and the urban environment that favored them, risking being turned, retreated behind the central position of Brichetto, more easily defendable by its natural obstacles. This is the only firm point on the front. Led by Dichat de Loisinge, a man of duty, the Piedmontese repelled a first assault, carried out according to the rules of the art, and caused significant losses to the French (12). It takes his death during a counterattack for the defenders to disband. The abandoned cannons were immediately turned against Mondovì. Von Colli-Marchini spreads the confusion by trying to quell it, the soldiers start to shoot at random before taking shelter behind the Ellero, where the officers struggle to reconstitute the units.
Meanwhile, in Mondovì, the population, panicked by the bombardment and who had, from mid-afternoon, engaged in talks with the attackers, forced the governor to surrender the town with its garrison (1,300 men, several senior officers including a lieutenant general).
But the last feat of arms of the day is for the Piedmontese: seeking to cross the Ellero with 150 dragoons to cut off the retreat of the latter, General Stengel is engaged at Cassanio by the 125 horsemen of Colonel Jean-Baptiste d’Oncieux of Chaffardon and almost immediately mortally wounded. Colonel Troulle, two other officers, and several cavalrymen fell shortly after. Bonaparte, having a strong opinion of Stengel, said that his light cavalry had been murdered.
Piedmont capitulates
After Mondovì, Bonaparte moved to Cherasco, Sérurier to Fossano and Augereau to Alba. Meanwhile, in Turin, Victor Amadeus III held a council. Despite a certain discouragement due to the lack of exact information on the situation and the absence of Austrian support (13), the king and the soldiers were inclined to continue the fight. But the need to deal became clear when news of the French advance arrived. Moreover, on the ground, von Colli-Marchini proposes a suspension of weapons.
Mondovì objective
Seeing the enemy slip away at daybreak, Bonaparte immediately launched the pursuit. The Sardinians, powerless to maneuver, pushed aside despite fierce resistance and the urban environment that favored them, risking being turned, retreated behind the central position of Brichetto, more easily defendable by its natural obstacles. This is the only firm point on the front. Led by Dichat de Loisinge, a man of duty, the Piedmontese repelled a first assault, carried out according to the rules of the art, and caused significant losses to the French (12). It takes his death during a counterattack for the defenders to disband. The abandoned cannons were immediately turned against Mondovì. Von Colli-Marchini spreads the confusion by trying to quell it, the soldiers start to shoot at random before taking shelter behind the Ellero, where the officers struggle to reconstitute the units.
Meanwhile, in Mondovì, the population, panicked by the bombardment and who had, from mid-afternoon, engaged in talks with the attackers, forced the governor to surrender the town with its garrison (1,300 men, several senior officers including a lieutenant general).
But the last feat of arms of the day is for the Piedmontese: seeking to cross the Ellero with 150 dragoons to cut off the retreat of the latter, General Stengel is engaged at Cassanio by the 125 horsemen of Colonel Jean-Baptiste d'Oncieux of Chaffardon and almost immediately mortally wounded. Colonel Troulle, two other officers, and several cavalrymen fell shortly after. Bonaparte, having a strong opinion of Stengel, said that his light cavalry had been murdered.
Piedmont capitulates
After Mondovì, Bonaparte moved to Cherasco, Sérurier to Fossano and Augereau to Alba. Meanwhile, in Turin, Victor Amadeus III held a council. Despite a certain discouragement due to the lack of exact information on the situation and the absence of Austrian support (13), the king and the soldiers were inclined to continue the fight. But the need to deal became clear when news of the French advance arrived. Moreover, on the ground, von Colli-Marchini proposed a suspension of weapons.
For his part, Bonaparte can only wish for it. Although he was able to complete his forces (14), he nevertheless foresees a difficult march on Turin. The enemy forces remained superior in number and the Piedmontese cavalry was intact at a time when fighting in the open countryside was looming. Treating therefore means sparing yourself from difficulties, escaping a possible reversal of fortune, and the possibility of turning all your forces against the Austrians. Also, while continuing his advance, Bonaparte sent Murat to negotiate at Fossano.
On the 27th at 10:30 p.m., the Sardinian plenipotentiaries (15) presented themselves at the French headquarters in Cherasco. Knowing he was in a position of strength, Bonaparte cut short their attempts to procrastinate: “You should find me moderate! » he tells them, adding not to demand anything that violates the laws of honor. At midnight, he decides to end it: “I may lose battles but I will never be seen wasting moments out of confidence or laziness. » He specifies that a general offensive is imminent. Meeting the demands of the winner, the Piedmontese representatives signed the armistice. It's 2 a.m.
Thus Bonaparte, almost unknown a month ago but who possesses "the instinct for war" and is "perhaps the only one in the army who [has] a goal", imposes "a decided color to war” and his name to Europe. Feeling “called to influence the fate of peoples,” he was already in the process of becoming Napoleon.
(1) Bonaparte refused to be submissive or even associated with the one who considered himself “the best general in Europe”.
(2) If the Austro-Piedmontese allies have absolute superiority in forces, each army is less numerous than the French army, which has approximately 42,000 men in actual strength (102,000 in theoretical strength). In his Memoirs, Napoleon gave the figure of 50,000, without specifying the nature of the force. Clausewitz denies the claim that the Austrian army lacked for nothing, attributing it to the French wanting to create a contrast with their troops. According to him, on the contrary, the imperial soldiers suffered a state of chronic famine, usual in the armies of the time, the abundance being verified only in certain details of the pack. The Austrians took nine days' worth of rations, the French took two.
(3) The terms “Sardines” and “Piedmontese” correspond to the same troops since at that time Victor Amadeus III was the sovereign of the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia.
(4) Cervoni returned to Savona on the 11th, where Bonaparte reviewed his brigade.
(5) Bonaparte, believing that Laharpe was sufficient to lead the pursuit, withdrew Masséna. The end of the battle was quite chaotic as fleeing Austrian units managed to cross the French lines while Piedmontese soldiers managed to take two mountain pieces from the French.
(6) Supported by von Colli-Marchini, Provera, arriving without being detected, could undoubtedly have changed the course of the campaign. The Piedmontese refused to surrender several times and Bonaparte, surprised by this resistance, imagined it as an omen of the imminent arrival of von Colli-Marchini. In reality, he ignores the situation in Cosseria.
(7) They capture eight battalions with their artillery. The captured French emigrants, who continued the fight with deserters from the Republican army within the autonomous company, were all shot.
(8) The French lost 600 men against 270 to the Piedmontese. But for them, the French withdrawal is only the prelude to a new attempt at envelopment when this is nothing of the sort.
(9) The Langhes are a hilly and wine-growing region on the edge of Piedmont.
(10) The governor of the place negotiates his peace in exchange for neutrality towards the Republican troops. Despite this agreement, the latter used their artillery. But the fort would nevertheless only surrender after the suspension of hostilities.
(11) He had to cross the Tanaro at Niella.
(12) It is against Bricchetto that the French accuse almost all of their 600 losses. The Piedmontese had 800. In San Michele, where according to Bonaparte they were "heroic", they on the other hand only lost 350 and inflicted 800 on their republican adversaries.
(13) The Austrians are especially concerned with blocking the road to their possessions in Milan and Mantua.
(14) His victories allowed him to complete his cannon and horse fleets. He also abandoned his Savona line of communication and, narrowing the connection with Paris, established that of Orméa and the Tanaro Valley, where stores had been set up before the offensive. Finally, the connection with the Army of the Alps is about to be established and the Army of Italy is preparing to absorb it.
(15) Lieutenant-General Baron de la Tour and Colonel Marquis Costa de Beauregard, Chief of the General Staff of the army of von Colli-Marchini. On the French side, the armistice will be signed by Bonaparte and the People's Commissioner Antoine Saliceti.
1796
March
26
Proclamation of Bonaparte to the Army of Italy.
April
2
Departure of the French from Nice.
8
Beaulieu moves towards Genoa
9
Bonaparte sets up his headquarters in Savona.
12
Battle of Montenotte.
13
Battle of Millesimo.
15
Battle of Dego.
19
Battle of San Michele.
21
Battle of Mondovì.
28
The signing of the armistice at Cherasco.
1797
Jean-Pierre de Beaulieu
Field Marshal de Beaulieu, newly appointed, wants to take advantage of his action on Genoa to gain the confidence of his troops. Seventy-two years old, he had already fought the French in Flanders in 1792. But, more experienced than talented, he did not have “all the qualities” necessary for his position and “only knew the old tactics”. He also despises Lieutenant General Michael Freiherr von Colli-Marchini, fifty-four years old including thirty-six under arms, who commands 20,000 Sardinians and has longer experience on this front. Old-style soldiers, have great concern for their lines of communication and practice linear attack, totally unsuitable in the mountains and in the face of the form of war that Bonaparte will impose on them, which uses the flexibility of the divisional system.
The importance of intelligence
Established in 1792, the Republican spy network functions largely thanks to expatriate Italians. These are zealous propagandists of revolutionary ideas, notably thanks to the press, while collecting money (A) and information. Thus, on the eve of the offensive, Masséna had first-hand information on the disposition of the allied forces at the Cadibona pass. Bonaparte used these “patriots” as scarecrows against the Piedmontese court, using Jacobin networks for subversive actions according to circumstances and his needs. He also asks his senior subordinates to form their networks while the “spymaster” Angelo Pico has his complete trust and is only responsible to him. To the Piedmontese plenipotentiaries who do not want to believe in the use of "such vile" weapons and "scoundrels" on the part of someone "endowed with so many means, strength and genius", he replied that the right to war allows all available means to be used to defeat an adversary and assures them that their country “is completely undermined.”
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