“You must have the principle that war must feed war,” Napoleon recommended to Marshal Soult during his appointment, on July 14, 1810, when he was general in chief of the Army of the South in Spain. However, “if war was to fuel war, peace must, after victory, provide the reward.” The French Emperor draws this reward, at his discretion and without any control other than his will, from a fund called the Extraordinary Domain. This fund is the very essence of the Napoleonic system: fueled by French military victories, it aims to reward, based on merit, soldiers, and civilians who have demonstrated courage or devotion to the homeland.
The Senatus-consult of January 30, 1810, gives the Extraordinary Domain a legal framework and specifies all of its objectives. Thus, “it is made up of the domains and movable and immovable property that the Emperor, exercising the rights of peace and war, acquires by conquests or treaties, either public or secret. This domain must cover the expenses of the army, allow the Emperor to reward his soldiers and the great civil and military services rendered to the State, raise monuments to the glory of France, carry out public works, encourage the arts, and add to the splendor of the Empire.”
Until 1810, this army fund was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for French victories. After the campaign of 1809, Napoleon gave it a legal framework, to which he added a more political aspect. After having shown the French his military superiority, he now wants to prove that, under his reign, France shines and shows itself worthy of becoming the capital of a Europe dominated by France, through major works, magnifying the political power and economy of the country.
However, while these goals are laudable, the system is perverse. Indeed, the Extraordinary Domain is primarily financed by contributions required by France under diplomatic treaties. They are becoming real scourges in France's relations with other European powers. Often brutal, Napoleonic diplomacy crushed and humiliated the vanquished, while the allies were forced to divert part of their finances to the French troops to be maintained, on the orders of the Emperor. In reality, if the Extraordinary Domain was a political instrument for Napoleon, it was a real burden for the rest of Europe, often crushed under the constraints it imposed.
Originally, the army fund
The idea that an army in the field must support itself is not new. Looting and requisitions mark the limits of States, whose military spending, always increasing, does not make it possible to meet the needs of soldiers. However, if the fact is not new, the economic and military context of France under the Revolution allows us to better understand the need to create a fund capable of making the army financially autonomous.
Indeed, it is worth remembering the problem linked to the fall in the value of the assignat. Far from discrediting itself by increasing revenues while reducing spending, the State relies on this scrap of paper, which leads to a fall in its value, exacerbated by the context of war at the borders. 98% of military expenditure is financed by the issuance of assignats which continue to proliferate: 5 billion at the end of 1793, 27 billion at the end of 1795 (2). The depreciation is increasing. 100 pounds of assignats were worth 38 pounds in gold at the end of 1793, reaching 0.6 at the end of 1795 – a value so low that the paper used to create them was more valuable than the assignat itself.
If the Directory abandoned the assignat on February 19, 1796, it created territorial mandates on the same principle, with the same consequences: a 74% drop in their value in just a few days. The Directory must seek new revenues and support a war against the Austrian power on two fronts, being able to count only on abandoned soldiers ready to turn their weapons against it. He entrusted a young general, Bonaparte, with an army of 30,000 men with a precise roadmap, aiming to plunder Italy of its wealth to support French finances. Far from carrying out orders, he will use the fruits of the looting to build loyalty in the army, and thus evade directives from Paris.
Implementation during the Italian campaign
In the eyes of directors, Italy positions itself as an advanced base that must provide the wealth capable of relaunching the French economic machine. To achieve this objective, we must count on an army lacking everything. To save the situation, Bonaparte is forced to apply the concept of self-financing an army in the field: war feeds war. To maintain this army and fulfill the mission of the Directory, it must impose war contributions on the regions. The victories of Lodi, Arcole, and Rivoli enabled him to do so. Thus, each town or village is imposed a war tax, ranging from 20,000 pounds for Lodi to 250,000 pounds for larger towns.
On 10 Thermidor Year IV, France imposed almost 62 million pounds on Italy (3), the vast majority of which was consumed locally, and used to pay for the soldiers' pay and supplies. Even more, Bonaparte rewards the most deserving soldiers with monetary donations. Like the Roman Imperatores, he built up a clientele, which he rewarded for his efforts. While the other armies are paid in assignats, the army of Italy becomes, in fact, a sort of army of mercenaries devoted to Bonaparte, and obliged to remain in Italy, as long as France cannot pay it. even. The soldiers' feeling of gratitude for the general is all the more visible as the army does not like the Directory regime.
If Bonaparte succeeded in making nearly 50,000 soldiers independent at the end of the Italian campaign, Napoleon would have to manage the pay of 150,000 soldiers ready to leave for the German campaign, without putting too much strain on the public treasury.
A response to Napoleon's bet
Upon his accession to power, the Emperor had a great design, that of imposing perpetual peace in Europe. Indeed, in the Memorial, he speaks of a “European confederation”, governed by the same principles embodied in a European code, a European Court of Cassation, a common currency…
The dynastic interests of kings and their secret diplomacy are supplanted by collective and economic interests (4). However, dynastic interests take precedence over common interests, hence the wars for domination in Europe. Thus, Napoleon wanted to unite through exclusive domination of the continent. To do this, it must militarily constrain the great powers. Such a vision requires an explosion in military spending, which can only be financed by taxes. Indeed, the maintenance of troops is a real financial burden for States. The Emperor, unable to afford to delegitimize his power, decided to apply his experience in Italy to an army of several hundred thousand soldiers. The troops in France will be equipped by taxpayers but will have to provide for their needs as soon as the border is crossed. Only the balance will be paid by the Treasury.
To limit the weight of the war on the French, the Grande Armée imposed war contributions on all localities, allied or enemy. The entire Napoleonic campaign brought in more than 1.2 billion francs in war contributions. The lightning campaigns of 1805 and 1806 made it possible, as in Italy, to make the army completely self-sufficient. Daru's role is essential. He makes deals with the towns to buy food and ammunition, directly from the army's treasury. Better still, he created factories in the conquered countries. From October 1, 1806, to October 15, 1808, he supplied 142,343 clothes, 206,977 jackets and vests, 247,623 breeches and pants, 254,536 greatcoats, 173,068 pouches, 347,000 shirts, 20,000 pairs of boots, 1,250,000 shoes. In addition, 215,000 rations of bread, 90,000 of liquid, 54,000 of rice and vegetables, 125,000 of meat, and 30,000 of barley and oats are also collected daily (5).
After the signing of the Treaty of Pressburg, 3 million francs remained in the fund, which proves that the campaign of 1805 cost the French nothing. Napoleon wrote to Barbé-Marbois: “You can no longer send money to this army, even for pay. » At the end of 1808, the accounts of the paymaster general showed a balance from the Prussian campaign of 35 million francs.
From the army fund to the Extraordinary Domain
It was on January 30, 1810, that the Extraordinary Domain was established. Its objectives are to provide for the needs of soldiers and to reward great servants of the state. The army fund was already doing this. In this case, the Domaine Extraordinaire fund is the heir.
However, other tasks are added such as the construction of large buildings or major works. Why did you add such objectives? One of the reasons is geopolitical. By 1810, there were simply no more enemies on the continent. The defeat of Austria and the signing of the Treaty of Schönbrunn on October 14, 1809, put an end to the Fifth Coalition. The only enemy capable of standing up to the Emperor is crushed. In other words, the great powers are either led by those close to Napoleon (the Napoleonides) or allied with France because of their past defeats (Prussia, Austria). Thus, in this context of almost total domination of France, the army fund can afford to limit expenses linked to the war and turn towards the internal economy, since apart from in the Iberian Peninsula, peace reigns everywhere.
The vast majority of the Extraordinary Domain's income is made up of contributions from the third, fourth, and fifth coalitions, paid in the form of bonds at 5% interest. The funds come primarily from war contributions, but also from diplomatic treaties concluded with allies and enemies concerning land cessations. The transfer of territories acquired by France and handed over to its allies is carried out in exchange for compensation. To reward his soldiers, Napoleon reserved a certain number of allodial estates in the allied countries, bringing him millions of francs per year.
In other words, the cession of territories by France to its allies can be compared to a poisoned gift, since each of the newly acquired territories must be paid to the Emperor, in an amount equivalent to its value. For example, the transfer of the margraviate of Bayreuth, Salzburg, and the Innviertel to Bavaria was made in exchange for 15 million francs on February 28, 1810.
The Extraordinary Domain can also count on other resources, such as bonds with which the fund is encumbered, notably on the Midi, Loing, and Orléans canals, but also loans to French cities. As of January 31, 1810, revenue from the three canals brought in 943,000 francs to the Extraordinary Domain (6). We must also not forget various loans of several million francs, which the Extraordinary Domain grants to foreign powers, particularly Germans, to help them pay their war contributions. To this are finally added the various revenues from the allodial domains of Spain, and especially Germany, belonging to the Emperor, worth more than 15 million francs.
To briefly summarize, the Extraordinary Domain is a fund used to invest money received from the vanquished in the French economy. Of course, his goal is not to see his funds diminish and disappear. Indeed, each financial action, from a simple loan to countries, such as Westphalia, to loans to French institutions, such as the sinking fund, can only be done through the repayment of interest. Thus, the fund is permanently self-financing and recovers the fruit of its investments, plus its interest. As of January 31, 1810, the Extraordinary Domain had more than 205 million francs, practically the equivalent of the civil expenditure of the State in 1805 (7).
Goals
The first objective of the Extraordinary Domain is above all to make armies in the field autonomous. However, after the campaign, Napoleon must reward his soldiers. Overseas estates are undoubtedly the most prestigious awards reserved for the military's elite. Thus, in the dictionary of Westphalian donees, of the 913 military personnel awarded, all are general or superior officers. Among the best equipped, we find the marshals. Berthier, for example, can count on income amounting to more than a million francs. Income from foreign domains is drawn from productive assets, such as mills, salt works, and factories, to which must be added the seigneurial rights that weigh on residents. In addition to areas abroad, soldiers can count on other types of rewards such as canal shares, worth 10,000 francs, earning 5% per year. In total, the 1,400 actions on the Loing and Orléans canals are distributed between 780 people with different names. This figure also takes into account changes in ownership in the event of the death of the shareholder, between 1809 and 1815. Finally, monetary donations represent by far the most common rewards, often worth 250 francs. They are reserved for ordinary soldiers.
Throughout the Empire, Napoleon rewarded 5,866 civilians and soldiers from the funds of the Extraordinary Domain, for a value of several tens of millions of francs. Each year, it distributes between 15 and 30 million francs as gratuities (8). In addition to rewarding the soldiers, the funds from the Extraordinary Domain are used to support the French economy in the form of loans. In Paris, Napoleon orders the city to be cleaned up. The creation of slaughterhouses, cemeteries, and new fountains are the fruits of the Sanitation Council of the city of Paris. Napoleon rebuilt the Wheat Market and markets to meet the needs of Parisians. Finally, loans to the city of Paris make it possible to beautify it and make it more accessible. We find the Pont des Arts, the Pont d'Austerlitz, the Pont d'Léna. In his Memoirs, Baron Fain estimates all of the Parisian works between 1804 and 1813 at 212 million francs, of which 50 million came from the Extraordinary Estate.
The funds of the Extraordinary Domain are also used to magnify the power of the Emperor, through major restoration or construction works on the imperial palaces. Five special funds coming directly from the Extraordinary Domain have been specially created. Among the latter are funds intended to renovate the Louvre, Versailles, and the Marly machine, while others are intended to build the Galerie Napoléon, the Saint-Napoleon church, and its palace for the King of Rome. Thus, of the 119,830,000 francs planned for the various projects relating to the palaces and imperial buildings, 62 million were spent in 1813, including 32 million by the Extraordinary Domain, not counting the 22 million intended to acquire Crown domains. , and another 30 million intended for the purchase of diamonds, jewelry, or paintings (9).
Limits
The principle of the army fund is inherently perverse. Indeed, it is an official looting fund, fueled by military victories. Its functioning is therefore based on three essential elements: the victory of the French troops, a short campaign to avoid additional expenses, and the need to wage war against powers sufficiently powerful and rich to be able to impose them. However, war has not always fueled war.
The first “disappointing” campaign on a financial level was that of Portugal in 1807. Junot was unable to raise the 100 million francs in contributions wanted by Napoleon. In Spain, finances were so bad that the Emperor asked the Bank of France to lend 25 million francs to Joseph. Ultimately, these 25 million will be paid by the army fund. The victorious army lends the defeated the resources necessary for its survival.
For the army's treasury, the Spanish War was a defeat. To meet the needs of the 350,000 soldiers stationed on the Peninsula, the Public Treasury was forced to send funds to Spain, otherwise, the army would starve. Between January 1810 and June 1811, 50 million francs were drawn directly from the Treasury. According to an estimate by Mollien, the Spanish conflict would have cost France 350 million francs, while the same sum would have been taken from the Peninsula for the benefit of the army. Between 1810 and 1814, Suchet administered the provinces of Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia. In four years, of the 73 million revenues he collected, only 7 million were sent to Madrid, the rest having been used for the French army.
The campaign of 1809 was also disappointing for Napoleon. He wrote to Mollien: “This campaign has not given me as much as the previous one. » (10) After 1810, expenses only increased. If the Domaine Extraordinaire has several hundred million francs, we must never forget that the vast majority of its funds are bonds from all over Europe. So the hundreds of millions do not correspond to the funds available. On the contrary, the majority are financial securities, from which Domaine only receives the interest. This wealth is in reality relatively difficult to mobilize and only represents financial capital. The increase in the number of soldiers and the expenses linked to the new functions of the army fund reduced the fund's funds, going from 205 million francs at the end of 1810 to 150 million at the end of 1811. The following campaigns, due to retirements and military defeats, are, for their part, completely deficit. In the absence of evidence, there is every reason to believe that during the Saxon campaign, the army's coffers were empty.
Furthermore, to survive, the Extraordinary Domain must rely on war, its use by Napoleon as a political weapon helps explain one of the reasons for the collapse of the Empire. Indeed, between 1810 and 1812, the absence of major military victories caused the fund's resources to melt away. To remedy this, the Emperor developed a brutal and humiliating policy towards the European powers. He preserved the funds of the Extraordinary Domain by ordering the European powers to maintain part of his army. On average, the 300,000 French soldiers stationed abroad represented a saving of nearly 40 million francs, allowing Napoleon to keep 750,000 men under the flag. More generally, the total amount paid by the allied countries for the barracking of French troops on their soil, between 1803 and 1813, amounts to nearly 130 million francs.
The allies are no better off. The Emperor's demands explode military budgets. In addition to barracks, Napoleon demanded that troops be raised in all allied countries. However, these troop levies are above the real capacities of States. We must never forget that Napoleon reserved domains for himself in almost all of Europe, which deprived the States of hundreds of thousands of francs if not millions. The most famous example is that of the Kingdom of Westphalia. The majority of the wealth of this kingdom comes from products from the estates, half of which should have gone to Napoleon's brother. Jérôme's financial situation is all the more worrying given that his lands had been subject to war contributions in 1806 and that the areas reserved by Napoleon to reward his soldiers were the richest in the kingdom. In addition, these lands are not taxable, which reduces Westphalia's income by several million francs per year. For some states, French requirements linked to its soldiers represent up to 50% of their expenses.
Allies or enemies, the Emperor's demands plunged States into a policy of rejection of the vision of a Napoleonic Europe, exacerbated by an awakening of nationalism. In France, the situation is similar. If the army treasury protected the French from additional tax levies at the start of the Empire, the lack of victories forced Napoleon to levy new indirect taxes, notably on alcohol and tobacco, although they were very unpopular. The additional costs generated by military campaigns were only 48% covered by war. The rest was financed by French taxation, becoming overwhelming after 1812.
The bet to save French finances is lost and explains; in part, the disaffection not only of the army, which was no longer rewarded for lack of means, but more generally of the French from the imperial cause.
Comments