As a bastion of the Catholic monarchy, Cuba is a strategic island in the Spanish imperial framework in the Americas. Throughout the revolutionary and imperial period, it remained loyal to the Bourbons and impervious to various subversions.
Gonzague Espinosa-Dassonneville / Ph.D. in history, delegate of the Napoleonic Memory in Aquitaine
At the end of the 18th century, Cuba was a general captaincy with jurisdiction over immense territories: the two Cuban provinces, Puerto Rico, Florida (until 1817), and Louisiana (until 1801). The island served as a hub for trade between Spain and the Americas. It was positioned along the Carrera de Indias route. Havana, its capital, benefited from the fleet's passage from the Indies, bringing precious metals and other exotic products from the New World to Cadiz. This port held the commercial monopoly of Atlantic trade until 1778, when "liberalization" occurred for different ports of the Iberian Peninsula, although trade with foreign ports remained prohibited. Havana was also the most fortified city in America, serving as a stronghold for the Spanish navy.
A sugar island
During the 18th century, the beginning of plantation economies on the island – generally intended for export to Europe or other parts of the Spanish possessions – led to a resurgence of the slave trade. By the eve of the French Revolution, 90% of the Cuban population was black. The importance of sugar and tobacco (and coffee) in the island's agricultural economy was paramount. Still, the gains were incomparable to those brought in by the neighboring island of Saint-Domingue. The "Pearl of the Antilles" annually yielded France 40 million pesos, four times more than what America gave Spain. This gap resulted from the poor development of its territories.
The "sugarocracy" – the Havana aristocracy enriched by sugar – managed to monopolize the monetary flows from Mexico and accumulate the capital necessary for the development of the sugar economy. They held both economic and local political power within the cabildo. Prosperous and protected, the merchants showed great loyalty to the Crown, a sentiment carefully cultivated by King Charles III (1759-1788) and his successors, for example, through granting noble titles. However, the British capture of Havana in 1762 was an actual trauma for Spain, revealing weaknesses in its imperial structure. As early as 1763, Spain began the construction of the San Carlos de la Cabaña fortress, the most important in America.
After the Seven Years ' War, the new geopolitical order in America worried Madrid, as it now saw Great Britain as a permanent threat to its coveted empire. Major political, military, and commercial reforms were implemented without opposition. Cuba notably served as a "laboratory of the Catholic monarchy" before extending reforms to the rest of the empire.
Land of refuge
The outbreak of the French Revolution prompts Spain to exercise great caution. It desires to prevent revolutionary contagion while still wishing to maintain diplomatic relations with France. However, gradually, any French resident in America or any Spanish person influenced by subversive ideas comes to be seen as a potential suspect. Some have their assets seized or expelled, as was the case in Cuba as early as November 1789, or even deported to Cadiz.
The Caribbean islands were particularly exposed to the revolutionary influence of the French Antilles. Between 1791 and 1808, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 French individuals of all backgrounds emigrated to Cuba. They fled the slave uprising in Saint-Domingue and later the Haitian Revolution after the failure of General Leclerc's expedition (between 1801 and 1803), which could only sustain itself thanks to food and financial aid sent by the Captain General of Cuba, the Marquis of Someruelos.
The French refugees arrived with whatever belongings they could salvage and a few enslaved people. They mainly settled in the eastern part of the island, especially in Santiago de Cuba. Some lost everything and attempted to integrate into Cuban society. Very few responded to English offers to reclaim Saint-Domingue. On the Iberian side, nearly 9,000 inhabitants fled the Spanish part of the island to Cuba.
In 1795, the island experienced troubles similar to those in Curaçao and neighboring Jamaica, but these were quickly contained by colonial power. The "freedom of the French" (abolition of slavery) served as a rallying cry for slave revolts, with equality becoming a common denominator among free blacks, mulattoes, and even poor whites.
The revolutionary wars and Spain's changing alliances transformed its Caribbean possessions into havens for French fleeing Haiti, Dominicans unwilling to become French citizens, or those seeking to escape Haitian invasion, and Trinidadians rejecting British domination. Even the future Louis-Philippe spent some time in exile in Havana (1798-1799) before being asked to leave by the Spanish king to avoid upsetting the Directory. These forced population movements to Puerto Rico and Cuba significantly reinforced their image as Spanish strongholds in the Caribbean. While Cuba had its fleet, most of its American territories lacked sufficient naval forces to defend the coasts, leading Spain to rely on France and its pirates, who could do little against the mighty English warships.
The sugar boom
Colonial authorities viewed the arrival of French refugees, sugar cane and coffee planters, technicians, and artisans favorably, hoping they would invigorate the island's economy. About fifteen of them even enlisted in the island's troops. Formerly enslaved people were also welcomed but remained under close surveillance. However, authorities were more cautious about the enslaved people accompanying the planters, fearing they might spread revolutionary ideas on the island.
Members of the sugar aristocracy expressed their "compassion" towards these emigrants and promised to "perpetually mourn" the revolution in Saint-Domingue. But, with pragmatism, they also saw in these events "an opportunity to give our agriculture a definitive advantage over the French." The French brought practical technical know-how and a considerable financial windfall. They participated in modernizing production methods. French planters managed estates of various sizes, primarily focusing on coffee but also playing a significant role in the development of sugar cane cultivation, which only needed a push. Cuban sugar and coffee production would increase throughout the 19th century despite a decline between 1808 and 1815 due to war and the expulsion of the French. Saint-Domingue, definitively out of the game, gave way to Cuba.
The Choice of Fidelity
In May 1808, the unexpected crisis of the Catholic monarchy would lead to immeasurable consequences. Indeed, no one could foresee Napoleon deposing the Bourbons of Spain. A veritable "big bang" within the Spanish empire triggered a revolutionary process in a monarchy suddenly left without a head. This was followed by several months of anarchy during which Spaniards from both hemispheres divided over which authority to recognize: that of Joseph, the new king imposed by Napoleon, or that of Ferdinand VII, who ascended the throne just a few weeks earlier. Supporters of the latter formed juntas in many Spanish cities before gathering in a Central Junta (created in September 1808) to continue the fight against the Napoleonic armies.
The consequences of this sudden chain of unforeseen events soon made themselves felt in America. In Havana, news of the uprising on May 2nd reached the cabildo by the end of May, but the population was only informed on July 17th. During this interval, the sugar aristocracy had the opportunity to analyze the political situation before finally swearing loyalty to the Bourbons, who had pampered them so much. They were all the more willing to defend the old order, knowing that any division among whites could lead to a "Haitian-style" revolution. Moreover, this act had the advantage of changing nothing in the situation. The oligarchy continued administering affairs harmoniously with the Captain General, and the sugar economy thrived. The new alliance with the United Kingdom even hinted at lucrative commercial operations. Despite implementing the liberal constitution of Cadiz (1812), which diminished some of its power, the sugar aristocracy managed to safeguard the essence of its interests and influence. Its abolition in 1814 upon Ferdinand VII's return was met with joy.
When an autonomous junta was proposed in 1808 – as in nearly all capitals of the empire on behalf of the captive king – by Francisco Arango, spokesman for the haciendas of Havana, he was countered by General (and planter) Montalvo, the island's second-in-command. Upon this proposal, it is reported that he "interrupted Arango in his reading and, pounding his fist on the table, protested that no supreme or provincial junta would be installed as long as he carried his sword and was alive." Supported by most notables and the Captain General, he managed to nip the project in the bud.
On July 17, 1808, Someruelos announced the arrival of several publications from the newly formed Supreme Junta of Seville, which declared itself the legitimate government of Spain during Ferdinand VII's captivity. It confirmed the details of the monarchy's downfall and the usurpation of the throne by a "vile foreigner." As in all of America, this news triggered an explosion of patriotic fervor towards the captive king. Concerned about rallying the colored population, anonymous texts did not hesitate to address them directly, thus mitigating the fear of a slave uprising during this imperial crisis. This strategy relied, in particular, on official declarations from representatives of the Blacks of Havana, who aligned with the positions of the oligarchy. Monfundi Silimun, president of a cabildo de nación, drafted a text addressed to his flock that left no room for doubt: "This thief, Mr. Bonaparte, has stolen everything from King Ferdinand VII of Spain by deceiving the Spaniards like turkeys to steal their lands, their fathers, their children, their wives, and the money from their churches. [...] We will swear before Mr. the governor to defend Havana until we die together with the Spaniards, defend Spain, God Jesus Christ, the Church, and King Ferdinand VII." Someruelos' conciliatory policy played a significant role in this rallying, providing them opportunities for individual advancement within a highly unequal colonial society.
While the Captain General criticized "the dreadful conduct of the French" and celebrated the heroism of Spanish resistance, he aimed to calm popular agitation through declarations intended to maintain public order and channel this fervor towards more productive activities such as donations to finance the war in Europe. He even encouraged moderation towards French emigrants. At the same time, he mobilized the colony's defenses to prevent a potential attack from France.
Napoleonic Attempts
The initial months of Joseph's government were dedicated to establishing a conciliatory policy supported by his ministers, including the afrancesados Azanza, Urquijo, O’Farrill (from Cuba), and Mazarredo. Their support primarily stemmed from the desire to avoid a conflict that would devastate the kingdom and lead to the loss of America, the existence of a strong central power to prevent anarchy, and the hope that the new dynasty would implement moderate reform plans. They were confident in their friendly ties with certain leaders of the juntas, believing they could make them reconsider their "seditious" commitment.
The ministers targeted Cuba for its strategic position near the United States, serving as a base of operations for Napoleonic agents (fifty-four Spaniards from Europe and America, six French) and its sizeable French colony, the largest in Spanish America. At the time, this colony represented 6% of the island's total population and 22% of its eastern province. Someruelos was also a prime target because of his proximity to enlightened circles and Josephine ministers. Urquijo, then Prime Minister (1798-1800), appointed him Captain General of Cuba in 1799. His father-in-law, the Count of Montarco, had sided with Joseph, making him suspicious in the eyes of Seville. He even tendered his resignation of any suspect to clear himself, asking to serve wherever the Supreme Junta deemed him valuable. His resignation was refused, and he remained in office until 1812. Following orders, he systematically publicly burned letters sent to him by the afrancesado ministers.
Unfortunately for Joseph, his agents began to act in America (1809-1810) at a time when the political situation in Cuba—and the rest of America—had already been decisively settled in favor of the Bourbons. Napoleon's reassertion of Spain after the capitulation of Bailén wasted precious time in the race for recognition by competent authorities. This recognition was crucial in the early months following the abdications at Bayonne. Despite their efforts, Joseph's attempts proved fruitless.
"Vipers in our Midst"
As the situation in Europe evolved, reservations regarding French emigrants began to grow, shifting from allies to enemies. By the end of 1808, justified concerns about the true allegiance of these residents turned into hysteria among the population and colonial authorities. This change in attitude resulted from increased communication with the Supreme Junta and Havana newspapers reporting on the battles in Spain. The governor of West Florida reported to Someruelos that he had welcomed a French refugee fleeing Cuba due to persecution based on his nationality.
By late February 1809, Someruelos distributed a copy of an ordinance dated November 1st, 1808, which commanded him to prevent "the introduction into the districts under his command of any person loyal to the French government as well as seditious papers." On March 2nd, the aldermen of Havana declared their support for the expulsion of the French community, whose members were considered "vipers in our midst," citing their "misconduct, immorality, depraved morals, [and] inveterate hatred of Spanish customs, habits, and religion." At this point, Someruelos had already established vigilance committees tasked with monitoring the French.
On March 12th, in a final effort to quell the rising anti-French xenophobia, the Captain General ordered "prudent surveillance over the conduct of the French population" "to ensure that no French emissary or supporters of their cause find their way into this province," and to report any suspicious individuals to the authorities. However, these measures were insufficient to calm popular passions. Yielding to this new reality and perhaps seeking to demonstrate his loyalty, Someruelos decided to expel the French from the island.
Unsurprisingly, the fusion of widespread fears and authorities proved inflammatory. Havana was rocked by several days of anti-French riots and looting (March 21-23), sparked by a predominantly black crowd motivated by their sense of patriotism and fairness, as well as opportunism and vengeance. The authorities eventually controlled the situation at the cost of dropping charges, contrary to what had happened in the rest of Spanish America, where anti-French sentiment led to autonomy favorable to Ferdinand VII, represented by local juntas led by locals. Instead of presenting the rioters as political actors, colonial authorities preferred to describe them as common criminals, thus minimizing the threat they might pose.
After these riots, the situation for French residents became untenable. In August, the authorities of Santiago de Cuba recorded the departure of 8,870 people. By the end of the year, the vast majority of the French had left the island, mainly heading towards New Orleans, where they continued to arouse suspicion from Spanish authorities. Only a few were naturalized or protected by the local oligarchy with whom they had business dealings.
Contrary to Independence Movements
Without support from the metropolis, it was occupied by the French until 1813; Cuba and Puerto Rico served as a rear base for the royalists to resist the autonomist (and later independent) movements in the American territories. After Napoleon's defeat, it served as a launching point for troops sent to reinforce or reconquer parts of the continent before retreating once defeat was inevitable.
Due to the weakness of its navy, Spain had to rely on the English squadron from Jamaica to deter French privateers and escort its ships. Privateering had indeed become widespread in the Caribbean. In Cuba, plans were devised to destroy these pirates, the most significant of whom were the Frenchman Louis Aury and the Curacien Luis Brión, who had allied with Venezuela under Bolívar. However, due to a lack of ships, crews, qualified officers, and money, the fight against these privateers was disorderly and ineffective.
Cuba did not remain unaffected by the upheavals experienced in the rest of the Spanish possessions. An independence plot hatched by alleged members of a Masonic lodge in Havana was discovered in 1810, and its perpetrators were sentenced to exile. More serious was the slave revolt led in 1812 by Juan Domingo Aponte, a black militia officer, which was eventually crushed. Some had participated in the riots of 1809 and referred to them as "the revolution of the blacks when they attacked and robbed the French." Three years after the events, it was revealed that the riot had been much more than a common crime.
From reading the testimonies, it becomes clear that the invasion of Spain caused less concern among white Cubans than the potential political consequences it might have among the enslaved people and freedmen. The Creoles opted for "eternal loyalty" to Spain, which they believed would protect them from future revolutionary movements. However, Cuba did not break free from colonial "domination" until 1899, so the island was not considered part of the emancipation movement, unlike the heroic deeds of South American "national epics."
Bibliography
Dominique Gonçalves, Le planteur et le roi. L’aristocratie havanaise et la Couronne d’Espagne (1763-1838), Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2008. I Sigfrido Vázquez Cienfuegos, Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba. El gobierno del Marqués de Someruelos (1799-1812), Séville, Université de Séville, 2008. I Emmanuel Vincenot, Histoire de La Havane, Paris, Fayard, 2016.
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